Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would

actually like to begin by saying that for Administration witnesses

nothing is more illuminating and helpful than to open a hearing of

this kind with the back-and-forth that I have just been privileged

to hear. The only thing I could think of that would be better would

be if I had the opportunity to ask you questions for the remainder

of the hour, and perhaps as a procedural innovation we might

think of that next time.

Mr. Chairman, I have a fuller statement which I would ask to

have put into the record.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss

Russian foreign policy and Russian-American relations. Even

before the Kosovo conflict revealed deep disagreement between

Russia and the United States on this defining international problem,

Members of this Committee had raised questions, the kind

that you have raised today and others, about the premises of our

approach toward Russia. You have asked where Russian foreign

policy, for that matter Russia itself, is headed.

Today’s headlines about President Yeltsin’s dismissal of Prime

Minister Primakov give rise to further questions, and I am ready

to say a few words about this situation later if you wish.

All these are large and urgent issues on which we need a frank

and open dialogue between the Administration and the Congress.

Our success will depend on the degree to which we can develop a

common perspective, understanding, and strategy; and I hope we

can contribute to that end today.

Mr. Chairman, our dialogue should start with a recognition of

how thoroughly our relations with Russia have been transformed

in the 1990’s, as some of you have noted. The first post-Cold War

decade, which is now almost behind us, has been marked by a pattern

of cooperation between Russia and the United States that was

unimaginable before the collapse of Soviet communism. I don’t need

to recite the diplomatic landmarks of this period, but they were all

attended by the closest possible communications and coordination

between Moscow and Washington.

As important as they were, however, the achievements of the

1990’s did not obscure the fact that there are many in Russia who

reject partnership with the West. They have rarely been so vocal

as during the current Kosovo conflict. Some of these critics seem

motivated by frustration at Russia’s weakness. Others display outright

hostility toward the United States and democratic capitalism.

Still other opponents of cooperation with the United States seem

guided by narrow economic or bureaucratic interests, and other opposition

politicians find foreign policy issues a useful, rhetorical

club with which to beat the government.

I might note that as Russia heads toward parliamentary elections

this fall and Presidential elections in 2000, we should expect

to hear more of this kind of rhetoric.

This mix of motives and perspectives, as well as the weak lines

of institutional authority and control, can make it difficult to say

what Russian foreign policy really is. Is it the offensive press

spokesman of the defense ministry who compares NATO to Nazis,

or is it the prudent decision to keep the number of Russian warships

off the coast of Yugoslavia to a minimum?

At a time like this, we have to keep our eye on fundamentals,

on the core interests and practical results that we want to advance

in our dealings with Russia.

Last fall in Chicago, Secretary Albright stated, ‘‘Our most important

priority in dealing with Russia is to protect the safety of the

American people.’’ In this spirit, and recognizing how many aspects

of our relations I am leaving aside, whether it is economic issues

or support for independent media, I propose today to touch on four

security challenges we face and give you a brief assessment of the

progress we are making in addressing them with Russia.

Let me start with nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War

made possible Russian-American agreement on deeper cuts in strategic

nuclear arsenals than ever before, and both governments are

committed to negotiating further cuts. Unfortunately, the START

II treaty has become a political football in the Russian parliament.

Despite the lack of progress toward ratification of the treaty, however,

we are active on a number of fronts to bring our arsenals into

line with post-Cold War realities. We have had expert consultations

on the shape of a possible START III agreement, which could bring

forces down by as much as 80 percent from Cold War highs.

Russian and U.S. officials have also met to implement the agreement

reached last year by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on sharing

early warning data on missile launches. We have begun a serious

dialogue on the arms control implications of President Clinton’s

directive to explore limited national missile defense.

Mr. Chairman, three-quarters of our assistance dollars to Russia

go to reduce the danger that nuclear and other weapons of mass

destruction will fall into the wrong hands. The expanded threat reduction

initiative, if approved by this Congress, will further

strengthen our ability to block proliferation threats emanating

from Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. I

strongly urge you to support this program and to fully fund the Administration’s

$1.03 billion assistance request for Eastern Europe

and Eurasia.

Mr. Chairman, Russian-American cooperation on proliferation

problems also has a strong basis in common interest; and let me

say a word about that, because we have taken some important

steps forward recently.

Our Special Ambassador, Bob Gallucci, and the Russian Space

Agency head, Yuri Koptev, have developed a work plan to address

some of our most pressing concerns about missile proliferation. We

have concluded a similar plan to enhance export controls on nuclear

technologies. American and Russian experts met last month

to begin implementation of these plans, and we will continue to

make this issue a high priority until we solve it.

Third, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the question of Russian-

American cooperation on the Kosovo problem. Until the opening of

NATO’s air campaign, our approaches to this matter had been

broadly similar, including joint support of Resolution 1199 in the

U.N. security council last fall. The Russian leaders had also made

clear that they would not support the use of force by NATO, and

when our military action began in March, it produced an outburst

of Russian anger and hyperbole at all levels and across the political

spectrum.

Since this initial rhetorical spasm, however, the Russian Government

has adopted a posture different from Communist and nationalist

spokesmen in two important ways. First, the government has

expressed its determination to stay out of the conflict, providing

neither military equipment nor military intelligence. We have no

information contradicting these statements.

Second, the Russian Government has sought to identify principles

that could be the basis for a political settlement of the conflict.

In Oslo last month, Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister

Ivanov reached an agreement on all but one of these principles.

Last week in Bonn the G–8 foreign ministers took another step forward

and agreed on a full set of principles, including deployment

of a strong and effective international security presence.

Today, a United States team led by Deputy Secretary Strobe

Talbott is in Moscow for further consultations with Foreign Minister

Ivanov and Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who

serves as President Yeltsin’s special representative. We welcome

Russia’s movement toward joining the growing international consensus

on this conflict, just as we welcome the prospect of Russian

participation in a peace keeping force—and, I might say, participation

by other countries as well.

Mr. Chairman, our interest in working with Russia to resolve the

Kosovo crisis is but one example of an ambitious effort to deal cooperatively

with problems of European security.

Consider the breakthrough agreement reached at the end of

March on adaptation of the CFE treaty. This hard-won result was

possible because the 30 nations around the negotiating table focused

on what they could gain by agreeing rather than on the myriad

obstacles in their way. The new agreement now provides an impetus

for Russia to withdraw its troops and munitions from

Moldova and to begin drawing down its forces in Georgia. If Russia

will take steps to fulfill commitments it has made, the United

States and others stand ready to help it deal with some of the practical

problems that are involved.

Russian-American cooperation extends to other areas, Mr. Chairman;

to Nagorno-Karabakh where our diplomats work together; to

Bosnia where our troops serve side by side.

If we are honest, we have to admit that the Kosovo crisis has put

new strains on Russian-American cooperation. Russia’s cooperation

with NATO seems likely to be on hold for the duration of the crisis,

but the framework for this cooperation, the NATO-Russia Founding

Act, remains intact. So do the interests, Russian and American,

that led to its creation in the first place. On this basis of common

interest, we should expect both sides to be making active use of

this framework once the Kosovo crisis is behind us.

Mr. Chairman, I am sometimes asked by Russian journalists

whether the U.S. Government is bothered by the apparent rise of

anti-Americanism in Russia. My answer of course is yes; if it took

hold, anti-Americanism would limit the ability of the Russian Government

to pursue our common interests. But let me give you the

second half of my answer as well.

To my mind, anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and

more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions

and, above all, attacking democracy itself. Looked at from this

angle, the problem actually seems a little less hopeless, for everything

that we know about Russian public opinion suggests that

support for democracy remains strong in that country. As long as

it does, support for cooperation with the West, for integration rather

than isolation, is likely to remain strong as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions and

those of your colleagues.

Their objectives, if we look at what

they say, are to end this conflict. They say that it has to be ended

on a basis that protects the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and

with that we can agree.

They say that they aim at a set of other objectives, like the return

of refugees, the end of ethnic cleansing, and with those we can

agree.

We can’t agree on principles that will make it, or on goals that

would make it, impossible for the allies of NATO or for other countries

to actually deal effectively with the real problems that face

the Balkans.

If Russian objectives are to solve this problem in Kosovo and instability

in the Balkans more generally in a way that is simply

aimed at hampering American policy, then we won’t be able to cooperate;

but if it rests on the kinds of principles that their political

leaders have said are the ones that they are pursuing, then we

have a basis to cooperate.

Mr. Chairman, you raise a complicated

question, and I hope that you will put that same question

to Professor McFaul later because he is an especially careful student

of it. But let me say that there are both signs of anti-Americanism

in Russia that grow out of disagreement over, in the immediate

case, the conflict in Kosovo, and that grow out of ideological

motives.

There is still a large body of support for the Communist Party

in Russia, and it is nothing if not anti-American. At the same time,

it is important to see the sources of interest and affinity in Russian

public opinion toward the West.

There was a poll that came out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that

revealed that 60-plus percent of the Russian population favors closer

relations with the West and the United States. One can find

many different trends here. I think we have to take this problem

as we face it day by day.

Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in my

statement, our concern about the flow of missile technology and nuclear

technology from Russia to Iran is as great as yours, and there

is no problem we have been working on more actively over the past

couple of years than this one.

We have recently developed a work plan with the Russian authorities

to try to increase control over this flow of technology. If

we are able to succeed at that, it would create a basis for taking

another look at the launch quotas that you described. If we can’t

succeed at it, it will be very hard to do that.

Mr. Chairman, we should support

further IMF loans to Russia only if Russia is able to do what you

describe, and that is, put together an economic reform program

that creates confidence in the fund that it will be able to use the

money well and repay it. That is why this has been a protracted

negotiation between the Fund over the past several months, between

the Fund and Russia to work through the very strict conditionality

that the Fund has imposed.

I might note that the agreement that the Fund signed with the

Russian Government, reached with the Russian Government last

month, provides for the disbursement of funds only if the Russian

Government is able to take a number of prior actions, some of

which involve new legislation to accomplish exactly what you described,

that is, more effective economic reform.

Congressman, I hope it won’t surprise

you to hear that I, from time to time, argue in the discussions that

we have at the State Department that we need to stand up to Congress.

So I fully endorse your recommendation there.

I completely agree with you that part

of promoting an economic reform and recovery in Russia on a

sound basis that strengthens democracy involves promoting legitimate

business. I completely agree with you there.

Here is where we have a difficulty. It is hard for us to say simply,

there is one sector that we say is clean and legitimate, while

there is a dirty sector that goes on unregulated and uncontrolled

by the government.

Our approach has been, while encouraging what contacts we can

have with the defense industry in Russia, in promoting responsible

business practice by them, to urge the Russian Government to get

control of the dirty sector, and we need leverage to do that. The

space launch quota is one element of that leverage, but it is in the

Russian Government’s interest in many other ways to get control

of that dirty sector.

The Russian democratic experiment

is never going to succeed if one succumbs to that fatalism. We have

to work with them in order to be able to accomplish some of these

basic functions of government and of responsible international citizenship.

I mean, governments have got to be able to control that

kind of flow of technology or else they will not survive.

Russian tax collection, by the way, is up.

We have got to do more, though, than just rely on the commercial

incentives that are available to us, even though they are very

important. That is what I mentioned, the expanded threat reduction

initiative that we have presented to the Congress. That will

help us to prevent the proliferation of Russian expertise by employing

8,000 to 10,000 more Russian scientists. I hope we will have

your support on that.

Quickly on Belarus, Russians themselves

will differ on whether there is just talk or anything happening

there. It is a relationship about which both sides have very

many reservations, but we watch it closely. Particularly, we watch

it as a possible conduit for the flow of technology that we have been

talking about just now.

As to President Yeltsin’s change of prime ministers, he has—as

you know—an impeachment vote scheduled this week in the Duma.

He is putting another item on the table for them to address, which

is confirmation of the prime minister, and that will force the Duma

to consider which one it is going to go ahead with.

Congressman, I hope you didn’t misunderstand

what I meant by that remark about what is involved

in the growth of anti-Americanism in Russia. I didn’t mean to

trivialize it at all or to suggest that it is escapist.

To the contrary, I think it is, in fact, a broader phenomenon and

a deeper one perhaps even than the emotions that you suggest in

tracing a sense of Russian loyalty to Serbia—to Yugoslavia for

standing up to the German invasion in 1941. That is, there is a

deep identity crisis that is being resolved in post-Soviet Russia. It

involves questions like, shall we be democratic or not, are we part

of the West or not; and those are questions with which Russians

are wrestling, have been wrestling before this crisis and will continue

to wrestle with after this crisis.

I said, though, that it seems to me there is some reason for confidence

in the result because if the issue is ultimately the one that

I described, that is, this kind of identity crisis, what one sees is

rather strong support for a democratic orientation. That gives us,

I think, some reason to think that beyond this particular crisis

there will be grounds for common interests between us and Russia.

I did not in any sense mean to trivialize it, and perhaps this is

just a misunderstanding of the words.

I think there is, of course, a potential for the kind of change that

you describe, that is, a breach between Russia and America, depending

on the kind of answers that are given to the questions I

mention—to these questions I have characterized as an identity crisis.

Because there is that potential is why we are working on a cooperative

relationship with Russia, why we have pursued the integration

of Russia into international institutions and have spoken of

democratic Russia as entitled to a large and honorable place in

those institutions.

I don’t have anything to apologize for in pursuing and advocating

those policies, but I think they have to be based on a realistic assessment

on what is happening in Russia.

Can I add one comment on that, Mr.

Chairman, if I might?

Of course we took those ramifications into account. Our premise

in our relations with Russia is, first, that we have common interests

and we should pursue the kind of integration that I have described;

Second, that where we have disagreements, we can’t paper them

over just because we are afraid the Russians will take it badly. To

the contrary, we have to face up to those disagreements and pursue

policies that are in our interests.

On that basis, we can have a productive relationship with Russia.

Congressman, let me start with the

last one. The message at this critical juncture is we have an opportunity,

if Russia will seize it with us, to forge an international consensus

about how to deal with the Kosovo conflict. We have a

strong foundation for that consensus created by the agreement of

the G–8 foreign ministers last week. That was an agreement on

words, and now we have to see whether we actually can extend

that to an agreement on action.

Strobe Talbott’s team in Moscow is looking, in following up on

these meetings during former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s visit

to Washington for the G–8 foreign ministers’ meeting, at whether

we can go one level of detail deeper in understanding whether we

really do have or can forge a common approach.

We have no reason to think that Mr. Chernomyrdin’s role will

change. He’s been appointed by the President as a special representative

on this issue. He’s not part of the government apparatus

in which Members submitted their resignations today and all

of whom are on an acting basis from this day forward. He’s President

Yeltsin’s representative. Deputy Secretary Talbott met with

him today and will meet with him probably again tomorrow. We

have no reason to think he will not be one of the sources of—one

of the channels of—communication on this issue.

Of the significance of the change of prime minister ship, it is

rather hard to tell at this stage. We know Mr. Stepashin. We don’t

know whether he will have a mandate to pursue different policies

from Mr. Chernomyrdin. We can look at President Yeltsin’s statement

in which he expressed a commitment to accelerate economic

reform. He expresses his dissatisfaction with the pace at which

that had been pursued recently. In addition to expressing some

thanks to Prime Minister Primakov and appreciation for the role

he has played in stabilizing the situation in Russia, he did express

dissatisfaction on this front. We may see some signs that Mr.

Stepashin, if he is confirmed by the Duma, will have a mandate to

work actively in that area, and certainly it is very necessary.

Congressman, I can’t add anything to

what Mr. Gejdenson said, but I can answer the other questions

that you have put.

Ambassador Collins has, in fact, been on TV talking about this

issue and has been interviewed in the newspapers. It is a high priority

of ours to make sure that our views are understood by the

Russian people.

I have seen the statement that Mr. Chernomyrdin made in

China, or after his visit to China, proposing that the bombing has

to end first before other issues are addressed. From our point of

view, that is not a realistic way of solving this problem.

I think the Yugoslav Government understands

very well how to seize that opportunity.

I am getting beyond my portfolio

here, Congressman.

Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me

to say one word about the other question that the Congressman

raised, which was the significance of the change of the prime minister

ship for the Kosovo policy. Our assumption is that President

Yeltsin sets Russia’s direction on this issue.

I think the kind of feelings of

marginalization and helplessness that you described maybe are an

important part of what we are seeing now. You are certainly right

that ‘‘small-D’’ democrats in Russia can express anti-American

anger. I would add they do it with considerable unease, because I

think they sense what it is really about—that it is about the sort

of broad political choices, the sort of ultimate political choices about

the kind of country they are going to have and not just about policy

issues.

You mentioned this ‘‘we tried it their way’’ sense of frustration

created by last August’s crash.

Sure. What is interesting is right

after August there was a lot of that talk; ‘‘We tried it their way,

now we will try it our way.’’ You hear that much less now because

there is a kind of realism about what the real possibilities are in

the modern world.

People in Russia across the political spectrum who look hard at

what the real options are for Russia don’t kid themselves about a

third way. There is much less of such talk now than in the early

fall, and I think that is a very positive development.

I can’t improve on what you said.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Berman.

Mr. Campbell.

Might I just have one word here?

I wanted to say to Congressman

Campbell that he has given me the idea to say I need to clarify

what I meant by ‘‘stand up to the Congress,’’ which is I think something

that you would agree with, which is when we have a disagreement,

argue it out, say what we think. I will certainly convey,

probably without the full eloquence that you gave to it, your message

to Secretary Albright.

No, that is what 75 percent of our bilateral

assistance to Russia is, in the area of threat reduction, and

I think it is a very good investment. However, you should be aware

that there are many other forms of assistance that the Russian

Government receives from other countries and other institutions.

From international institutions, the Russian Government has received

credits on a very large scale. The IMF’s program in Russia

is now the largest single program that it has—its indebtedness or

the credits that it has extended to Russia. The World Bank has

large programs; the EBRD also. Many countries have extended

Eximbank credits, trade credits.

I will get some better numbers than

I can give you off the top of my head.

Tens of billions, surely.

It is a long process, and their economic

situation is very difficult. It is very difficult above all because—

not because the level of assistance has been inadequate, but

because Russian——

I am with you, Congressman. The 2

days and a pause is a formula that is unknown to me. I hope that

it is not established as retrospective in rewriting the history of this.

Congressman Ballenger, you are right

that China has become a big customer for Russian arms exports.

You are also right that we need to look carefully when arms transfers

of this kind have the potential to affect regional balances of

power and create dangerous capabilities that threaten our servicemen

who are stationed abroad. That is certainly the way in which

we look at this problem.

I might say to you that it is our judgment that Russian transfers

have not, in fact, significantly altered Chinese capabilities vis-a-vis

our own in this region, but it is an important issue to watch closely

because one could imagine transfers that would have that effect.

For that reason, this is an issue that we discussed with the Russians;

and were we to see the kind of trends that would have that

threatening potential, it would be a problem for us.

Let me say that we are concerned

about transfers, military transfers particularly, of sophisticated

equipment and capabilities from any direction to India because our

effort has been to—in the wake of India and Pakistan’s nuclear

tests—to show that there is an international consensus against the

appearance of new nuclear powers. I am not familiar with the particular

case that you are referring to, Congressman.

Let me see if I could leave it this

way, Congressman. I would be glad to arrange a classified briefing

for you on this subject. My understanding about the most recent

Russian transactions with the Indians in this case is that they involved

training and maintenance. Let me look into it further, and

if you would be interested in a classified briefing, we could certainly

set that up.

Often classified material.

They are ahead of me on this point,

Congressman, but I would be glad to look into this for you.

We have seen the press reports concerning the transfer of rocket

stages from Russia to India. The transfer of these rocket stages

was permitted by the agreement the United States negotiated with

Russia in July 1993 to resolve a 2-year dispute over Russian plans

to assist India in the indigenous production of cryogenic rockets.

The results of those negotiations were briefed to Congress and

widely reported in the press at the time.

Pursuant to the July 1993 agreement, which was implemented

beginning in September 1994, Russia agreed to limit the cryogenic

engine contract to the transfer of seven complete rocket-stages to

India.

We have no information to indicate the Russia has not been abiding

by its agreement. Were we to obtain information to the contrary,

we would make our concerns known to senior levels of the

Russian government, and would Urge the GOR to bring its missile

exports in line with its bilateral and multilateral missile nonproliferation

commitments.

Sure. I mean, this is the old joke the

Soviet Union didn’t have a military industrial complex; it was a

military industrial complex, and with capabilities across the spectrum.

There is no doubt if there were to be

a U.N. Security Council resolution on Kosovo, it would have to be

accepted by the permanent Member because they all have vetos.

When you find Russian and Chinese

spokesmen stating positions that are at odds with how we see the

situation and the path toward a solution, it obviously reduces the

likelihood that we are going to have consensus, a workable consensus,

in the Security Council.

As I mentioned earlier, Congressman, perhaps it was when you

were out of the room, from our point of view, what Mr.

Chernomyrdin said after his conversations with the Chinese was

unrealistic as a way of dealing with this problem. Proposing a

bombing halt before the crucial issues are resolved is simply not

the path that NATO has proposed or that will actually address this

problem.

Absolutely, Congressman. Before the

sort of deepening of the Kosovo conflict and crisis, last winter and

spring, we consulted closely with the Russians and worked together

with them to devise a settlement to the war in Bosnia. As I mentioned

earlier, our forces served side by side in Bosnia in SFOR

now, and have for, I believe, 3 or 4 years.

The consultations between Russian and American foreign ministries

have been close. Our diplomats have participated in the contact

group which has dealt with the Kosovo issue. President Yeltsin

and President Clinton have spoken several times since the air campaign

began and many times before that on this issue and have

corresponded on the same subject frequently.

We were cosponsors of the U.N. Security Council resolution last

fall. Our diplomats were together at the Rambouillet negotiations.

President Yeltsin, President Clinton issued a statement on Kosovo

at their summit in September in Moscow. So there has been no difficulty

in understanding each side.

We did not have full agreement with

the Russians at Rambouillet.

I hope there are some Russian diplomats here

and others as well. I would hate to think that they have something

better to do than to listen to our discussions. But I can assure you

that the State Department spends a lot of effort at internal security

measures to make sure that the people who work for us are

security-conscious, could carefully control the information that is

available to us that involves national security interests, and that

only the people who should have access to that information do, and

that only the people who should be working at the State Department

do. But if you are interested in a fuller discussion of that

question, I can arrange for it.

The other question you asked is who dictates Russian foreign policy,

and then you added as an aside, who dictates our policy. I

think probably the word that would make it hard to answer that

is ‘‘dictates,’’ because I think both processes are much more diffuse

and pluralist than the word ‘‘dictate’’ would allow.

The letter of the Russian Constitution gives the President the

authority over foreign policy, but he has a lot of people who work

for him. He has a foreign ministry, a defense ministry, an intelligence

apparatus, a security council, a personal staff, and all of

those institutions, and people have an influence. In addition, there

is a Parliament that has its prerogatives, not so different from

those in other countries, involving budgetary oversight.

Their congressional staffs are not as big. I let

you draw your own conclusions from that.

On the question of where our policy toward Russia, countries of

the former Soviet Union and other countries comes from, it comes

from a rather broad and open process of the same sort, which is

ultimately, under the President of the United States.

I don’t think I could have said anything of the

sort, Congressman. What I said is that the flow of missile technology

from Russia to other countries and particularly to Iran is

one of our greatest concerns, and something we have spent an immense

amount of time and effort trying to get the Russian Government

to address and control.

Please give me his name, and I will try to

straighten him out.

I spoke to Congressman Weldon a couple of

times about this question, and I am a little surprised by your recollection

of it, and I will tell you why. We had a discussion, he and

I, when he was in Vienna in the middle of his discussions with the

Duma-Congress group that was there, the kind of contact that, by

the way, we think is very positive.

Congressman Weldon said to me that he had been given some

vague statements from someone representing himself as an emissary

of President Milosevic indicating that it might be possible to

release prisoners if they visited. But he said he had no intention

of going unless there was a public statement that there would, in

fact, be a release of these prisoners so that he wasn’t subject to the

kind of bait and switch tactics that we have seen used by President

Milosevic sometime in the past. I thought that seemed like a very

good approach.

I thought we left it when we talked was that

his approach of insisting on a public statement that would get

him—would put President Milosevic on the record about an intention

to release prisoners seemed like a good protection for him. But

if your question is broader than this as to whether it seemed like

a good idea to get involved in negotiations with President

Milosevic, that did not seem advisable. But on the question of prisoners,

Congressman Weldon seemed rather aware of the risks involved

in going without firm assurances.

Our view and that of the NATO Alliance has

been that the only kind of peace keeping force that will solve the

problem of creating enough confidence for refugees to return is one

that has NATO at its core, and that is an unchanged position.

Chernomyrdin.

Congressman, President Yeltsin has

made some very strong statements about the importance of staying

out of this conflict. He has said that there is—and he has given directives

to make sure that there is no risk of that—that there is

no provision of military equipment to Yugoslavia which would violate

a U.N. embargo, that there is not a provision of military intelligence

to the Yugoslavs.

We don’t have any indication that anything is happening other

than what President Yeltsin has said on that, and we certainly

would not want the kind of hostilities that you describe to take

place. So we are mindful of that. They are very mindful of it.

Current Communist Party?

members.

I can’t speak about China. I can tell

you that the activities of the Russian Government indicate that

they are following the concert directives that President Yeltsin has

spoken of publicly.

As to the members of the Duma, they

are not in a position to make decisions of that kind.

Even then.

I think it is fair to say that the ethics

laws and regulations that govern the activities of Russian political

figures and the general practices are a little looser than they are

here.